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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
District Court Case 
vs. : No. 041906854 
STEVE WALLACE CARTER, : Appellate Court 
No. 20070323-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Appellant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in 
the Second District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated March 26, 2007. The 
Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at the 
Utah State Prison. Jurisdiction for the appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DID THE PRO SE MOTIONS AND LETTERS THE 
DEFENDANT SENT TO THE TRIAL JUDGE 
CONSTITUTE VALID MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Appellate Court must determine as a matter of law 
whether the Defendant's pro se letters and motions constituted a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. This is a legal question; and, therefore, the trial court's 
legal conclusions should be given no deference. "When a challenge to a trial 
court's decision concerns a question of law, we accord no particular deference, 
but review for correctness." State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). This issue was preserved for appeal when the Defendant filed a motion 
and sent letters asking to have his plea withdrawn. (R. 126-130, 159-51, 154-55, 
178) 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DIDN'T GRANT THE DEFENDANT A 
HEARING AND DIDN'T ALLOW THE DEFENDANT 
TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard of review. "We review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 
805 (Utah 1993). This issue was preserved when Defendant filed a motion as 
well as a number of letters indicating that he wanted to withdraw his plea. (R. 
126-130, 159-51, 154-55, 178) 
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III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO INQUIRE INTO DEFENDANT'S 
COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS ATTORNEY? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue should be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review. u[w]hether to appoint a different lawyer for an 
indigent defendant who expresses dissatisfaction with the court-appointed counsel 
... is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be 
reversed only for abuse of discretion." State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). This issue was preserved for appeal when Defendant wrote letters 
to the trial court asking to have a new attorney appointed to represent him. (R. 
126-130, 159-51, 154-55, 178) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated 
§58-37-8. Possession of a Controlled Substance Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it 
was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, 
or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
§58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(i) (1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, 
drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
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manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, 
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or 
otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in 
violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
§77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily 
made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a 
plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is 
announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is 
denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea 
shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period 
specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, 
Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital 
felony; 
Utah Rules Of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 11. Pleas 
See Addendum A. 
Rule 12. Motions. 
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which, 
unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance 
with this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the 
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grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not be 
accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was initially charged by Information with Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-
8(2)(a)(i), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of U.C.A. §58-37a-5(l). The information was amended at least twice, 
and the Defendant was ultimately charged with a first degree felony for 
Possession with the Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance with an 
enhancement for having a prior conviction. (R. 40-41, 79). A preliminary hearing 
was held on the amended charge, and the Defendant was bound over. (R. 85-86). 
This matter began with Defendant's arrest on December 15, 2004. Due to 
numerous continuances the Defendant was not sentenced until March 20, 2007. 
In between that time, Defendant was arrested, convicted and sentenced to prison 
on an unrelated matter out of Davis County. 
This case was eventually set for trial on February 1, 2006. (R. 95-96). The 
Defendant was to be tried for a first degree felony charge of Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance with a prior conviction for distribution of a controlled 
substance. On February 1, 2006, a jury was called and seated. However, before 
witnesses were called to testify, the Defendant and the State reached an agreement 
wherein the Defendant pled guilty to a second degree felony charge of possession 
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of a controlled substance. The charge was enhanced to a second degree felony 
based on the Defendant's prior conviction for distribution. (R. 211/2-19). 
Sentencing was scheduled for March 14, 2006. (R. 211/14). Defendant 
was represented by attorney Roy Cole at the time he entered into his plea. 
After the Defendant pled guilty, he began sending letters and "pro se" 
motions to the trial court. One was titled "Motion to Appoint Replacement 
Counsel for Appellant." (R. 126). In that motion he asked for his attorney to be 
replaced. He also filed a motion titled "Motion to Dismiss Counsel, Motion to 
Vacate Decision, and Motion to Appoint Attorney." (R. 127). In this motion the 
Defendant articulated a number of reasons why his attorney was essentially 
ineffective. The Defendant complained because his attorney told him that he had 
to plead to a charge that carried a one to fifteen sentence or that the State was 
pursuing a sentence of five years to life. The Defendant also complained that his 
confrontation clause rights were violated when he didn't get to cross-examine the 
witnesses. The Defendant also alleged that his attorney failed to assist him in pre-
trial discovery. In this motion the Defendant requested that his plea be vacated 
and that a new attorney be appointed. This motion was signed on February 7, 
2006. (R. 130). 
On March 14, 2006, the Defendant was present with attorney Martin 
Gravis. His sentencing was continued to May 16, 2006, because he indicated he 
was going to retain private counsel. (R. 135). On May 12, 2006, the trial court 
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received a letter from the Defendant. In this letter the Defendant informed the 
trial court that this case helped him realize that he needed treatment. He also told 
the court that he believed his attorney counseled him correctly. He also wrote that 
he has bi-polar disorder and A.D.D. with schizophrenic elements and that his 
therapist explained to him that he attempts to self-medicate. He concluded by 
apologizing to the court for the trouble he had caused and indicated that he would 
accept any "treatment, supervision, or consequences" that the court deemed to be 
necessary. (R. 139). 
On May 16, 2006, the Defendant asked to continue his sentencing because 
he needed additional time to retain private counsel. The sentencing was continued 
until July 11, 2006. (R. 143). On July 11th the Defendant asked for another 
continuance to retain private counsel. Sentencing was continued until August 1, 
2006. (R. 146). 
On August 1, 2006, the court received a motion from the Defendant titled 
"Motion for Dismissal." (R. 149). In this motion the Defendant indicated that he 
was "paranoid schizophrenia," and at the time of his plea he was not on 
medication. He claimed that his mental disorder is marked by "loss of awareness 
of reality often with disturbances of behavior and the inability to reason." He 
further claimed that his attorney was not aware of his mental disorders and 
therefore his attorney, Roy Cole, could not fairly defend him. The Defendant 
claimed that he was diagnosed with his mental disorder after he entered his plea. 
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He asked to withdraw his plea based on the mental disorder. He further claimed 
that "he did nothing", that the "drugs and things used to do drugs were not finger 
printed/' and that he was "set up by the lady that lived in the apartment." He also 
claimed that at the time of his arrest he "was confused and did not know what he 
said to arresting officers." The Defendant went on to ask the court to "dismiss 
this case without prejudice." (R. 149-151). 
At the Defendant's sentencing on that same date the matter was continued 
so the Motion to Dismiss and the Defendant's mental status at the prison could be 
reviewed. Sentencing was continued until September 12, 2006. (R. 152). On 
September 11, 2006, the court received another letter from the Defendant. In this 
letter the Defendant indicated that he was having problems communicating with 
his attorney. He also wrote the court that he entered the plea based on his 
attorney's advice that it was the best deal he could get. The Defendant explained 
that he "did not commit any crime except consumption of an illegal substance." 
He further stated that "I only, and in a once and brief moment, shared a pipe with 
the owner of the drugs." He told the judge that he was "a stupid drug user where I 
travel down the wrong path in a mis-guided attempt to self-medicate the pain my 
mental illness causes me." He asked the judge to not sentence him until a 
"thorough investigation" was made of his mental illness. (R. 154-55). 
On September 12, 2006, the matter was continued until October 10, 2006, 
so Mr. Cole could obtain the Defendant's mental health records from the prison so 
~ 8 ~ 
a determination could be made as to whether or not to proceed with sentencing. 
(R. 158). On September 12th it was continued until October 31st because Mr. Cole 
had not received the mental health records. (R. 163). 
On October 30 the court received a letter from the Defendant where he 
requested a copy of his plea agreement. He wanted to see if Mr. Cole 
misrepresented him to the nature of the plea. He wanted to make sure he pled to 
use of a controlled substance rather possession or distribution. (R. 167). 
On October 31st sentencing was continued until December 12, 2006, 
because Mr. Cole had still not received the mental evaluations. (R. 169). On 
November 20 , Mr. Cole filed a motion to compel the mental health records from 
the Utah State Prison. (R. 171). On December 12th the matter was continued until 
January 16, 2007, because Mr. Cole hadn't received the mental health records. 
(R. 174). On January 16th, sentencing was continued until February 6, 2007. (R. 
176). On February 5, 2007, the court received another letter from the Defendant. 
He complained that he hadn't had adequate communication with his attorney. He 
also complained of "being bounced around the legal system" for two years 
without due process. He concluded by saying u[a]t this juncture either dismiss 
this case (which is warranted as reflected by the lengthy record) or go ahead and 
railroad me into a wrongful conviction and sentence, but do so with the 
appointment of legal appellate counsel so that I can take a first appeal of right and 
be heard on the truth that there is not a factual basis for the conviction and I 
~ 9 ~ 
entered into it on a plea of guilty that was not made knowingly and 
willingly/voluntarily because of my very real mental health and competency 
issues that were ignored at the trial phase.'5 (R. 178). 
On February 6, 2007, Mr. Cole still hadn't received the records from the 
prison. The matter was continued until March 6, 2007. (R. 181). On March 6 , 
the Defendant was not present in court. However, Mr. Cole had received the 
mental health records from the prison. Mr. Cole informed the court that he would 
not be filing a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Sentencing was set for March 
20,2007. (R. 183). 
On March 20, 2007, the Defendant was finally sentenced. He was 
sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. He was given 
credit for the time he had been in custody, and the sentence was ordered to run 
concurrent with his prison sentence that he was serving on an unrelated matter. 
(R. 186-87,212/7). 
At his sentencing, the Defendant didn't ask to have his plea withdrawn. 
Before the court proceeded with sentencing it asked the Defendant, "Mr. Carter, 
anything you would like to say before sentence is imposed?" The Defendant 
answered, "I just answer Your Honor to consider running it consecutive with the— 
" His attorney corrected him and he said "concurrent with the charge I'm on." 
(R. 212/3) 
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The next day on March 21, 2007, the Court received a letter from the 
Defendant. It was dated October 9, 2006, but not received by the Court until 
March 21, 2007. In this letter the Defendant stated his desire to have his plea 
withdrawn because of his mental illness and because his plea was entered 
unknowingly and unwillingly and that he didn't have the mens rea necessary for 
the conviction. (R. 188). On the same date the court received a letter that was 
dated March 19, 2007. In this letter the Defendant asks for someone to evaluate 
his mental state at the time he pled guilty. He asks the Court to help him enforce 
his rights to a speedy trial and a knowing and willful plea. (R. 190). On April 11, 
2007, the court received a letter from the Defendant that was dated April 9, 2007. 
In this letter the Defendant informed the Court that he wanted to appeal his 
conviction because his plea was not voluntary, there hadn't been a hearing to 
determine his competence, and state funds hadn't been appointed for a forensic 
psychiatrist to determine whether his plea was knowingly entered. (R. 194). A 
Notice of Appeal was filed by counsel on April 17, 2007. (R. 198). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was arrested on December 15, 2004, for being in possession of 
methamphetamine. He was in a bathroom where two glass pipes and two baggies 
of methamphetamine were located. The police officer who arrested him and filled 
out a probable cause affidavit put in the probable cause affidavit that Defendant 
admitted that the pipes and methamphetamine were his. (R. 003). 
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The Defendant's charges were eventually amended to include a first degree 
felony, for distribution of a controlled substance. A preliminary hearing was held 
on that charge, and Defendant was bound over to stand trial. (R. 85-6). On the 
day of trial after the jury had been selected, Defendant pled guilty to an amended 
charge of possession of a controlled substance, with a prior conviction for 
distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony. At the time the 
plea was entered Defendant told the court that he knew what he was doing, and he 
felt it was his best option. (R. 211/3-6). At the time of the plea, Defendant denied 
that he took drugs to the home. He did admit that he "got high there" and that "I 
admit that I used." (R. /21 1/3-4) The plea agreement was written to indicate that 
Defendant was pleading to "use of a controlled substance." (R. 121-123). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant made a motion to the court where he expressed his desire to 
have his plea withdrawn. He asserted that due to his mental illness his plea wasn't 
knowing and voluntarily entered. Based on this motion the Defendant should 
have been granted a hearing to determine if there was any validity to Defendant's 
claims. 
Defendant also complained of his relationship with his court appointed 
attorney. The trial court failed to inquire into Defendant's complaints to 
determine if there was a valid reason to appoint a new attorney to represent the 
Defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PRO SE LETTERS AND MOTIONS THE 
DEFENDANT SENT TO THE TRIAL JUDGE 
CONSTITUTED A VALID MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
The Defendant's pro se letters and motions which were sent to the trial 
court present two issues. First, were the letters the Defendant sent to the trial 
judge valid motions that should have been addressed? Second, did the 
Defendant's letters constitute a request to withdraw his guilty plea? 
a. The letters should be construed as motions to the court. 
Under §77-13-6 of the Utah Code, a Defendant can move to withdraw a 
plea of not guilty or no contest before the sentence is announced. The request 
"shall be made by motion before sentence is announced." U.C.A. §77-13-
6(2)(b)(2007). Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the 
filing of motions. Rule 12 states that "[a]n application to the court for an order 
shall be by motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or hearing shall 
be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity 
the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief sought." U.R. 
CrJP. Rule 12 (2007). 
In State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the Defendant filed 
a "pro se motion with the trial court requesting substitution of counsel." Id. at 
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961. This "motion" was apparently a letter because the Court of Appeals stated 
"[i]n the letter, defendant stated he felt counsel could not represent him because 
they had a "conflict of interest" and because counsel "refuses evidence I have 
brought forth ... for defence [sic] of my case." Id. 
State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), is another Utah case 
where the terms "letter" and "motion" are used interchangeably. In Canfield, the 
appellant "sent a letter to the trial court seeking permission to withdraw his plea." 
Id. The Defendant's "motion" was denied because it wasn't filed within thirty 
days. In the opinion, this Court referred to the letter as a motion. "The letter was 
date-stamped by the trial court clerk as filed on November 7, 1994. The trial 
court denied the motion to withdraw and a related motion to dismiss because the 
motions were not timely made,. .." Id. at 562. 
The Defendant's letters and pro se motions should be recognized as a 
timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In Defendant's motion to vacate he 
wrote the trial judge asking "to vacate and to request a new trial and counsel." (R. 
130). At another time, the Defendant filed a handwritten "Motion for Dismissal." 
In this motion the Defendant informed the trial court that he suffered from mental 
illnesses including bi-polar disorder. In paragraph seven of this motion, Defendant 
asked the trial court to allow him to withdraw his plea. (R 149-151). In the letter 
dated August 27, 2006, the Defendant informed the court that he suffers from 
mental illness and believed that his illness may have rendered his plea 
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involuntary. He further requested that he not be sentenced until a "thorough 
investigation" had been made into his mental illness. (R. 154-55). 
After receiving these letters and handwritten motions, the court continued 
sentencing a number of times so Mr. Cole could obtain some mental health 
records from the prison. After Mr. Cole obtained these records he informed the 
trial court that he wouldn't be filing a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. (R. 183-
84). 
In State v. West, 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988), the Defendant appealed from 
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Defendant 
had submitted a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 893. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
prepared pro se, is specifically based upon good cause. Although defendant might 
have drafted the motion more artfully, his intention was clear." Id. at 894. 
The Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reach the same 
conclusion. Even though the Defendant might have drafted his request more 
artfully, his intentions were clear. He repeated several times that he suffered from 
mental illnesses that he believed had rendered his plea involuntary. For this 
reason, this Court should find that the Defendant's letters and handwritten "pro-
se" motions were appropriate requests to withdraw his guilty plea, and the case 
should be remanded to the trial court to determine if the Defendant's plea was 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DIDN'T GRANT THE DEFENDANT A 
HEARING AND DIDN'T ALLOW THE DEFENDANT 
TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
In Utah, "A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave 
of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." 
U.C.A. §77-13-6 (2007). In State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), this Court held that compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure was not dispositive in determining a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
"A defendant can show good cause by putting forth evidence that the plea was in 
fact involuntary." State v. Humphrey, 79 P.3d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
Once a Defendant presents evidence that the plea was involuntary, "the 
court needs to assess the credibility of the evidence and make detailed findings on 
all relevant facts." Id. Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
requires the trial court to state its findings on the record when factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion. These findings must be sufficiently detailed to 
allow this Court the opportunity to adequately review the decision. See, State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In Humphrey, the defendant pled guilty and then filed a motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea. A hearing was held, and the defendant argued that his 
plea was not knowing and voluntary. He testified about his mental state on the 
morning he entered the plea, and he presented correspondence from a social 
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worker who had counseled him. State v. Humphrey, 79 P.3d at 961. The trial 
court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw the plea. This Court stated that 
"the record is unclear as to whether the court made the necessary credibility 
assessment and factual determinations based on the evidence." Id. at 962 
At the conclusion of the evidence in the trial court the judge had stated, 
"my observations of the defendant at the time was that he understood what he was 
doing; that he didn't appear to me to be under any more duress . . . . Fm going to 
deny the motion because I believe that [it] hasn't met the objective standard and I 
believe that anything that has been done here as the evidence today doesn't rise to 
a level that would make me . . . both according to law [and] good conscience, you 
know, grant the motion to withdraw the guilty plea." Id. (brackets in original) 
This Court remanded the case so the trial court could make the necessary 
factual findings to support its ruling. This Court found three reasons why the trial 
court was in error. (1) The trial court had applied an objective standard. (2) The 
trial court was uncertain as to whether it could consider the new evidence and 
instead relied solely on observations at the plea colloquy. (3) Most importantly, 
the trial court did not enter any detailed factual findings concerning the evidence 
the defendant presented at the hearing on his motion to withdraw the plea. Id. 
In the case at bar, the trial court could not enter any detailed factual 
findings because the court didn't allow the Defendant a hearing and an 
opportunity to present his evidence. In Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. 
- 1 7 -
App. 1988), the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In it he 
expressed dissatisfaction with the plea and with his attorney. The court 
discharged his attorney and appointed a new attorney to advise him on his motion 
to withdraw the guilty plea. Id. at 342. The court denied his motion and 
sentenced him to prison. He eventually filed a motion for writ of habeas corpus. 
This Court addressed the method by which to attack a guilty plea. Of importance 
to this appeal is the following language found in the conclusion. 
As we read the pertinent cases with an eye to harmonizing them, 
challenge may be made to a guilty plea either directly or 
collaterally. If it is made directly, it must be in the context of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the denial of which can be 
appealed. If it is made collaterally, no prior motion to withdraw is 
required. In either scenario, an evidentiary hearing must ordinarily 
be held unless the record of a prior hearing show petitioner is 
clearly not entitled to relief. 
Id. at 344-45. Defendant was entitled to a hearing to determine if there was any 
merit to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He is also entitled to sufficient 
findings. The Court also failed to enter detailed factual findings as to the 
evidence the Defendant presented because no evidence was presented. It is 
impossible for this Court to determine if the plea was voluntarily entered and if 
Defendant's mental illness had any bearing on the plea. For these reasons, this 
case should be remanded to the trial court, Defendant should be appointed new 
counsel, and a hearing should be held to determine whether there is a basis to 
withdraw the Defendant's plea. 
~ 1 8 ~ 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT FAILED TO INQUIRE INTO 
DEFENDANT'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS 
ATTORNEY. 
A trial court has a duty to ensure that an indigent Defendant receives 
effective assistance of counsel and that there is not a break down in 
communication between the Defendant and his court appoint attorney. In the past 
this Court has held that; 
when a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, the court 
must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine 
the nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of the 
facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship 
with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that 
sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that 
his or her Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for 
substitution. 
State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In the case at bar, the 
Defendant sent several communications to the trial judge where he requested a 
new attorney. In February the court received a letter where the Defendant wrote, 
"I feel that I need better effective assistance of councel [sic] on my behalf." (R. 
125). On the same date the court received a motion titled "Motion To Appoint & 
Replacement Counsel For Appellant." (R. 126). The court also received on the 
same date a motion to dismiss counsel and to "appoint attorney." (R. 127-30). 
In this motion the Defendant listed several reasons why he felt his attorney was 
ineffective and that he needed a new attorney. (R. 127-130). On October 31, 
~ 1 9 ~ 
2006, the court received a letter from the Defendant where he informed the court 
that Mr. Cole refused to communicate with him. (R. 167). 
In State v. Vessey, this Court stated that "a trial court's refusal to substitute 
counsel can only be properly reviewed if the trial court conducts a meaningful 
inquiry. Only the trial court can conduct a full evidentiary hearing to explore the 
substantiality of defendant's allegations without reference to subsequent 
developments and later-acquired knowledge." State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d at 964. 
In Vessey, this Court established the rule that "a trial court's failure to investigate 
a defendant's timely substitution request is per se error, but eschewing actual 
reversal until an actual conflict is established between the defendant and counsel 
of a magnitude requiring substitution of counsel." Id at 962-63. 
In the case at bar, the trial court did not inquire into Defendant's 
dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel. Defendant made his request known to 
the trial court on multiple occasions. At a minimum the trial court should have 
inquired into Defendant's complaints and determined if there was any validity to 
said complaints. Defendant respectfully requests that this matter be remanded 
back to the trial court to determine if he should receive a new attorney and for a 
hearing on his motions to withdraw his guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant was entitled to a hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea so the court could make adequate findings of fact to determine if the plea was 
- 20 
voluntarily entered. For these reasons, the case should be remanded to the trial 
court for a hearing on the motion and the Defendant should be appointed a new 
attorney. 
DATED this J_ day of February 2008. 
BSWTSMITH 
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Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented 
by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant 
shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to 
confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of 
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set 
for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden 
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, 
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may 
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, 
if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire 
into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make 
a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed 
to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, 
or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected 
by the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and 
the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may 
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant 
may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, 
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who 
prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the 
other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a 
whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is 
not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 2 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STEVE WALLACE CARTER, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041906854 FS 
Judge: SCOTT M HADLEY 
Date: March 20, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marykd 
Prosecutor: MAYNARD, BRANDON J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROY COLE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 19, 1959 
Video 
Tape Number: H032007 Tape Count: 1007/1105 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 2nd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/01/2006 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
CD19533160 
041906854 CARTER,STEVE WALLACE 
Page 1 
Case No: 041906854 
Date: Mar 20, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The prison sentence imposed in this case may run concurrently to 
the prison sentence the defendant is now serving. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends credit time served. 
Dated this J?6 day of ?7fao<Ut , 2 0 ^ 7 . 
SCOTT M HADLEY s 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
STEVE WALLACE CARTER, 
DEFENDANT. 
VIDEO TRANSCRIPT 
CASE NO. 041906854 
SENTENCING 
MARCH 20, 2007 
HONORABLE SCOTT M. HADLEY 
-h * -k -k * 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE STATE: BRANDEN MILES 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: ROY COLE 
O 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Carter is back. 
Where we at, Mr. Cole? 
MR. COLE: He's decided he wants to go ahead with 
sentencing, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is that the case, Mr. Carter --
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- that's what we're doing? Okay. 
I have read through the presentence report. I 
did -- and I've mentioned this before, found a correction or 
at leasr an inconsistency on pages 2 and 8 of the original 
presentence report. It's where it says that he's never been 
successful on probation and parole, and rhen later on it says 
where he was successful. 
THE DEFENDANT: I have been successful, Your Honor. 
MR. COLE: He has actually been successful, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: So I think it was ]ust a little 
overzealousness on the part of the original writer. This is 
the — 
MR. COLE: Well, it's called a typo. 
THE COURT: That would be generous to him. But this 
was the one given to Judge Page back m June of '05? 
MR. COLE: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. You ready to go, then? 
Diane W. Flanagan, PPR 
801.395.1056 
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MR. COLE: We are, four Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. COLE: The event j_n this particular case 
happened on about December 15th of '04. He's been m custody 
continuously since that time and after he pled guilty on 
March 14th of last year, as I recall, was supposed to be 
sentenced -- actually supposed to be sentenced March 14th of 
last year. So it would have been about sometime early 
February that he actually pled guilty on this matrer. 
That means he has been m for about two years and 
four months, so we've got an awful lot of time he's been m . 
We're asking Your Honor since he's done all that time to give 
him credit for time served, let him have drug board down at 
the prison if he qualifies for that, and just run this 
concurrent with the prison that he's already m on since he's 
done so much time. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Mr. Carter, anything you would like to say before 
sentence is imposed? 
THE DEFENDANT: I just ask Your Honor to consider 
running it consecutive with the --
MR. COLE: Concurrent. 
THE DEFENDANT: -- concurrent with the charge I'm 
on, 
THE COURT: Okay. That -- is that the one with 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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1 I Judge Page? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. 
3 THE COURT: And still requesting drug board. Pight? 
4 MR. COLE: Yeah, Your Honor. I think it would 
5 probably be a good idea to get him some points for getting 
6 out. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Now, you know that's 311st a 
8 recommendation from me. That's --
9 THE DEFENDANT: I understand. 
10 THE COURT: -- not m my control. 
11 THE DEFENDANT: I have completed their -- one of 
12 their drug programs out there to which with -- uhe board does 
13 recognize, but it's not like drug board. I mean, if I'm 
14 sentenced to do that, I know that's a whole different thing. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 And, Mr. Miles, from the State? 
17 MR. MILES: Just to make sure I'm clear, then. He 
18 was already sent to prison on a case of driving under the 
19 influence of alcohol, and I guess that was --
2 0 THE DEFENDANT: I never had a DUI m my life. I was 
21 sentenced for shoplifting. 
22 MR. MILES: Charge 30, felony, driving under the 
23 influence of alcohol, pled guilty to --
2 4 I THE COURT: It was the theft. 
2 5 I THE DEFENDANT: It was theft 
Diane W. Flanagan, PPR 
R01 39S.1056 
MR. COLE: Theft. 
MR. MILES: Oh, so that's a misprint --
MR. COLE: Yeah. 
MR. MILES: — on the PSI as well? 
THE DEFENDANT: There was a couple of misprints I 
found in there too. 
PROBATION OFFICER: It's theft. 
MR. MILES: Okay. So that theft he's already been 
sent to prison on --
PROBATION OFFICER: Yes. 
MR. MILES: -- which is why he's appearing out of 
prison today. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. MILES: And so he's been serving a term of 
imprisonment on that case pending the resolution of this 
case . 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. MILES: When was sentencing on the '06 case, 
then? 
THE COURT: It was set for -- as Mr. Cole pointed 
out, for March of '06. But the incident -- this incident 
actually predated the Judge Page incident, the theft. 
MR. MILES: Okay. So he's asking credit for time 
served from T04 to '06? 
MR. COLE: Well, he's been in custody. 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 5 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. Yeah, he's been in aboui -- the 
last time I checked it was almost 600 days then. 
MR. MILES: The State wouldn't have a problem giving 
him credit for time served when he was actually being held on 
this charge, but for the period of time he's been in prison 
on the other offense --
THE COURT: On the other one. 
MR. MILES: -- I don't know that he would be 
entitled to credit that given that he was serving a term of 
imprisonment imposed for that offense. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MILES: So the State would ask you not credit 
him for that portion of it. This defendant has a horrible 
criminal record -- I'm looking at it -- 52 some odd arrests, 
multiple felony convictions. The defendant has been on 
probation numerous times. Whether he's successfully 
completed it or not, his criminal history shows somebody who 
simply is not going to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law. 
So the real question, I think, today is not whether 
he should go to prison but whether it should run concurrent 
or consecutive, and I think given the nature of his record 
and the multitude of his offenses that Your Honor should send 
him down consecutively to the offense he's currently doing 
now even though you can credit him for time served, because 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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this defendant simply has earned that at this point. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. 
Any legal reason why sentence cannot be imposed? 
MR. COLE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Carter, this is a long time 
coming. It's been about a year just to try to get it to the 
sentencing point, but I!m going to do the following. In 
connection with your conviction of a second degree felony, 
possession of a controlled substance, considering all of the 
things that have been said here and m the past on the -- m 
similar hearings like this and recognizing the nature of the 
offense, I'm going to do the following. 
I'm going to sentence you to the Utah State Prison 
for one indeterminate term of one to 15 years, give you 
credit for the time that you have served and run it 
concurrent with any other sentence that you may be serving. 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Carter. 
(End of proceedings.) 
Diane W. Flanagan, RPR 
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ST^TE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, DIANE W. FLANAGAN, RPR, Official Court Reporter 
in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true and correct transcription from the 
videotape recording of the proceedings m the above-entitled 
matter. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative or 
employee or attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a 
relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or 
financially interested directly or indirectly m this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
seal of office at Ogden, Utah, this 11th day of September, 
2007. 
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Diane W. Flanagan 
Official Court Reporter 
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